The disproportionality of these numbers has led to criticism that the ICC is just another tool for enforcing Western political influence over international justice. 6 The Court's critics see its record of failing to prosecute serious international crimes outside of Africa as "sidelin[ing] * Articles Editor, Michigan Journal of International Law; J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, 2020. I would like to thank the MJIL editors who worked on this piece for their invaluable feedback and keen attention to detail. I would also like to thank Professor Laura Beny for her constant encouragement and her belief. To my family and friends, thank you for your unwavering support through law school and through this process. 3. Id. arts. 13-15 ter. As outlined in article 13, "[t]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15." Id Beginning when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2009, 14 these claims of prejudice have soured the once congenial relationship between the AU and the ICC. 15 Since that time, the ICC has issued indictments against at least twenty-one other Africans and has investigated at least six situations in African countries. 16 The AU vehemently opposed some of these indictments on the grounds that they violate the sovereign immunity that state leaders hold. 17 Consequently, the ICC's decisions to continue pursuing these indictments led the AU to call for a mass withdrawal of African states from the ICC's founding treaty, the Rome Statute. 18 The AU's position has been met with both support and contempt. 19 This note examines the ICC's treatment of sovereign immunity, specifically through the indictments of al-Bashir and Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. These three indictments have drawn particular criticism from the AU for violating the principle of sovereign immunity. 20 Through the lens of these indictments, this note concludes that the ICC's tendency to ignore sovereign immunityperhaps as a result of the Court's close relationship with the UNSC-does little to help it gain legitimacy in Africa and in the wider world and, more than anything, undermines the noble work encoded in the ICC's mandate. To show this, the note first delves into the background of the two organizations (the AU and the ICC) and the relationship they had prior to al-Bashir's first indictment (Part I). It then examines the doctrine of sovereign immunity and how the ICC has managed to make the defense nugatory for both States Parties and non-State Parties (Part II). Next, this note looks at the current relationship between the two organizations and how the breakdown in their relationship caused by the ICC's treatment of sovereign [Vol. 41:195 immunity has delegitimized the ICC, at least in Africa (Part III). Lastly, this paper presents the AU's response to the legitimacy crisis and proposes solutions for the ICC that would see the Court sever (or lessen) its relationship with the UNSC, adopt transparency measures that would help it return to the initial principles that brought African nations on board in the first place, and integrates aspect of legal (and cultural) institutions from the countries it investigates to help create a sense of cooperation between the Court and the nations it serves (Part IV).
I. History of the International Criminal Court and the African Union
The creation of the ICC was lauded as "a gift of hope to future generations and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law." 21 The Court was created on July 17, 1998, when 120 states adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the "Rome Statute" or the "Statute"). The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 after ratification by sixty countries. 22 The ICC's primary function is to prosecute individuals for four international crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity. 23 These crimes are seen as "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole[, which] must not go unpunished." 24 The AU's relationship with the ICC began amicably. Indeed, African states and organizations were among the first proponents of the creation of the Court. 25 In addition, African lawyers and human rights campaigners made significant contributions during campaigns for the creation of the International Criminal Court. 26 Africa's support for the ICC originated from the belief that the Court would help to uphold the rule of law when it came to the abuses and aggressive actions of more powerful states and would give African States Parties a more prominent position within international society. 27 For African states, the ICC was to be the bastion of justice that brought an end to the impunity that other, more powerful, states had flaunted. 28 
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Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC 199 On February 2, 1999, Senegal was the first state to ratify the Rome Statute, followed soon after by Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. 29 Currently, thirty-four African states, or two-thirds of all AU Member States, are represented among the States Parties to the Rome Statute. 30 This makes Africa the largest regional bloc represented in the ICC's Assembly of States Parties and "underscores the stakes in the present crisis of Africa-ICC relations." 31 The breakdown in camaraderie between the AU and the ICC began with the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. 32 The relationship worsened after the ICC issued arrest warrants for Kenyan heads of state Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, and it continues to deteriorate today because of what the AU sees as the Court's continued bias in pursuit of African heads of state. 33 In particular, the AU argues that the numerous and unabating prosecutions of Africans have created issues of "prosecution versus peace; arrest versus immunity; and trial [participation] versus presidential responsibilities." 34 The AU sees the ICC's indictment and prosecution of African leaders as both hypocritical and a threat to the stability and sovereignty that heads of state are granted through customary international law. 35 As a result, the AU has chosen to adopt a policy of obstruction towards the ICC. 36 
A. The Prosecution of Sudan's Omar Al-Bashir
In 2009, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC issued an initial arrest warrant for al-Bashir for war crimes committed since 2003 in the Darfur region. 37 The case was referred to the ICC by the UNSC in 2005, under Resolution 1593. 38 The ICC issued this arrest warrant with the intention of bringing justice to victims of the genocide and curbing the impunity that al-Bashir had enjoyed since the beginning of the conflict in the Darfur. 39 The Court issued a second arrest warrant in 2010, which added three additional charges 29.
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Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:195 for genocide. 40 That arrest warrant alleged that al-Bashir masterminded and implemented plans to annihilate three Sudanese ethnic groups-the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa-through murder, rape, and deportation. 41 However, some members of the AU did not see the arrest warrants as a means for bringing justice to the region. 42 Instead, they decried what they saw as an injustice against the sitting head of a state that was not party to the ICC's governing Rome Statute. 43 Former Libyan President and then AU Chairman Muammar Gaddafi 44 described al-Bashir's indictment as a form of terrorism instigated by the First World and as an effort "by [Western states] to recolonize their former colonies." 45 Arab and African leaders also saw al-Bashir's arrest warrant as a way to undermine the "unity and stability" that Sudan had developed under al-Bashir's reign. 46 Since the issuance of the arrest warrant, al-Bashir has traveled to and from countries both inside and outside of Africa with impunity. 47 After the thirteenth African Union Summit in 2009, the AU released a declaration stating that the members of the Spring 2020] Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC 203 prosecution while they held office. 61 On October 12, 2013, the African Union convened an Extraordinary Summit to discuss the AU's relationship with the ICC. 62 There, the AU Assembly, the highest decision-making body of the AU, decided "[t]hat no charges shall be commenced or continued before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their term of office." 63 It then demanded "[t]hat the trials of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto, who are the current serving leaders of the Republic of Kenya, [] be suspended until they complete their terms in office." 64 The AU also claimed that since Kenya had such a large role to play in maintaining peace in the Darfur region, arresting Kenyatta and Ruto would only serve to undermine, and even upheave, related efforts. 65 Ultimately, the ICC Prosecutor dropped the charges against Kenyatta and Ruto because of witness intimidation. 66 The Extraordinary Summit also served as an opportunity for some members of the AU to call for a mass withdrawal of African states from the ICC and the Rome Statute, 67 with the loudest voices coming from Kenya, 1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.
2.
A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective.
[Vol. 41:195 Sudan, Rwanda, Namibia, Chad, Uganda, and Ethiopia. 68 In large part due to a lack of broader Assembly support for such a drastic measure, these calls did not result in a mass exodus from the ICC. 69 So far, Burundi is the only African nation that has successfully withdrawn from the ICC. 70 Although Gambia and South Africa initially wished to withdraw from the ICC and the Rome Statute, they have since withdrawn their notices of intent to leave. 71 (Gambia justified its initial decision to leave as "warranted by the fact that the ICC, despite being called the International Criminal Court, is in fact an International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans." 72 South Africa, meanwhile, cited a "conflict of the ICC's Rome Statute with its domestic laws that grant leaders diplomatic immunity." 73 ) Similarly, while Kenya indicated a desire to withdraw from the ICC, it has not done so. In response to the ICC's warrants, which it perceived as the ICC's attempt to meddle in its internal affairs, the Kenyan Parliament passed a nonbinding motion asking the government to "withdraw from the II. Sovereign Immunity's Role at the ICC One of the AU's main grievances with the ICC concerns the Court's ability to prosecute sitting heads of state, like al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and Ruto. 75 In particular, the AU argues that the ICC's attempt to exercise jurisdiction over these three men violated the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 76 In other words, according to the AU, al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and Ruto are (or were) immune from prosecution by virtue of their roles as sitting heads of state for their respective countries. 77 Contrary to the AU's assertion, though it is true that all three men hold some immunity because of their positions, sitting heads of state do not possess absolute immunity simply because they currently hold office. 78 
A. Head of State Immunity Generally
Heads of state, whether current or former, used to enjoy absolute immunity. The development of international law and the emergence of new customs, however, has led to the erosion of this form of immunity. 79 As a result, under the current theory of "restrictive immunity," heads of state can be prosecuted for certain acts that are deemed egregious, such as war crimes 74.
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Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:195 and crimes against humanity. 80 One rationale behind the move towards a restricted standard of sovereign immunity is that the "[a]bsolute immunity theory does not differentiate between civil or criminal actions, and thus provides little recourse for those seeking justice, even if they are seeking it for the most grave human rights violations." 81 In contrast, the restrictive immunity theory ensures that the defense of immunity can never shield human rights violators, thereby allowing for prosecution of perpetrators and justice for victims. 82 The arrest of General Augusto Pinochet by the United Kingdom in 1998 is arguably the most salient indication that the norms of international law have shifted from absolute immunity to a more restrictive view of sovereign immunity. In 1973, Pinochet led a coup d'etat that ousted the then-President of Chile, Salvador Allende. 83 The violent aftermath of the coup led to human rights violations 84 for which he was indicted by a Spanish court in 1998. 85 Six days after the court's indictment, he was arrested in London and held there on charges of genocide, torture, hostage-taking, and large-scale murder. 86 During a hearing held in London to dismiss the arrest warrant issued by the Spanish court, Pinochet claimed immunity under the United Kingdom's State Immunity Act of 1978 as a former head of state. 87 The House of Lords, however, rejected his defense. It invoked the principle of universal jurisdiction, by which any state apprehending an alleged perpetrator is deemed competent to exercise its jurisdiction, and decreed that international crimes such as torture could not be protected by formerhead-of-state immunity. 88 Pinochet's arrest marked the first time a nation used the principle of universal jurisdiction to arrest a foreign head of state for crimes that had been committed in that leader's country. 89 Thus, though Spring 2020] Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC 207
Pinochet died before being convicted, his trial exemplified the increasing willingness of countries to hold foreign heads of state accountable for their actions, notwithstanding claims of sovereign immunity. 90 Moreover, it showed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction could be triggered by an individual's participation in genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 91 The arrest and trial of former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the "tribunal" or the "ICTY") further demonstrates the move towards the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The ICTY indicted Milosevic in 1999 for crimes against humanity committed during the Kosovo War and, a year later, added additional charges for violating the laws or customs of war, breaching the Geneva Conventions in Croatia and Bosnia, and committing genocide in Bosnia. 92 Milosevic's trial, which lasted from 2002 until his death in 2006, was the first by an international tribunal of a sitting head of state for state-sanctioned criminal activities and violations of human rights law. 93 Notably, Milosevic did not raise the defense of sovereign immunity. Some scholars argue that Milosevic did not raise the defense because "traditional notions of sovereign immunity [were already] disappearing in international law" and that, therefore, the defense would have served little to no purpose to his case. 94 Evidence of the disappearance of traditional notions of sovereign immunity from international law can be found in the ICTY's founding statute, the 1993 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian legal principle that reasons that certain activities are so reprehensible that the usual rules of jurisdiction are waived, and any state apprehending the alleged perpetrator is deemed competent to exercise its jurisdiction. VALERIE [Vol. 41:195 Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. The statute gave the tribunal the power to prosecute "[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided" in the international crimes committed during the Kosovo War. 95 This power explicitly extended to the prosecution of sovereigns, as the statute further provided that "the official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government [,] . . . shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment." 96 Though the statute creating the ICTY dismissed the notion of universal jurisdiction, the tribunal instead justified its unrestricted access to Milosevic-despite his role as a sitting head of state-as well as to his deputies, through the doctrine of primacy. 97 This access changed the landscape of sovereign immunity in international law, establishing precedent for the prosecution of crimes against humanity carried out by state actors.
B. Sovereign Immunity and the ICC
Both the Pinochet and Milosevic indictments and arrests altered the doctrine of sovereign immunity and provided a basis for the ICC's own method of sidestepping head-of-state immunity. However, the Court's relationship with sovereign immunity is more similar to that of the ICTY (as used in its indictment and prosecution of Milosevic), than to the universal jurisdiction that was used in Pinochet's case. 98 The text of the Rome Statute is similar to the text of the ICTY's founding statute. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that the defense of sovereign immunity does not bar the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over persons who are or were heads of state: This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 99 Moreover, the plain language of article 27(2) of the statute clearly indicates that head of state immunity is not a valid defense at the ICC: Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 100 Notably, article 27 makes no distinction between states that are party to the Agreement and those that are not, and it thus bars the immunity defense for all individuals brought before the Court. 101 Article 27's ability to negate the head-of-state defense for States is therefore an example of the more restrictive standard for sovereign immunity which, as stated above, prevents the defense from being used to shield human rights violators. 102 By employing the restrictive standard, the Court has an avenue through which it can accomplish its mandate of securing justice for victims of human rights violations across the globe.
Article 13(b) further supplements article 27's ability to strip head-ofstate immunity, and even extends the statute's applicability to non-party states. Article 13(b) denotes the UNSC's ability to refer cases to the ICC Prosecutor and states that the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over a crime if "[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations[.]" 103 As it currently stands, there are 194 signatories to the United Nations. 104 Chapter VII of the Charter states that all 194 signatories are legally bound to the resolutions passed by the UNSC; this includes resolutions recommending that the ICC Prosecutor bring charges against a head of state. 105 It has been posited that by signing the Charter, each State has implicitly waived the head-of-state defense in situations where the ICC brings charges based on the recommendation of the UNSC, regardless of whether the party is a signatory to the Rome Statute. 106 This argument suggests that the UNSC has universal jurisdiction, which allows it to bypass 100.
Id. art 27(2).
101.
Id head-of-state immunity when necessary to prosecute international crimes. 107 Thus, taken together, articles 27 and 13(b) arguably give the ICC wide latitude to exercise jurisdiction over countries that are not party to its founding statute. Nevertheless, while the Court does not recognize sovereign immunity as a defense, it does acknowledge that heads of state have certain other privileges of diplomatic immunity that may limit the Court's ability to apprehend them. 108 Because the ICC lacks a police force, it does not have the ability to arrest individuals it charges, and it instead relies on States Parties to assist it in the apprehension and extradition of individuals wanted by the Court. 109 However, the Rome Statute recognizes that there are limits to States Parties' ability to assist in this way. 110 Article 98(1) of the Statute speaks to the Court's limitations with respect to States Parties' obligations in assisting with the apprehension of defendants from third-party states. 111 The text states:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 112 In directing the ICC not to proceed with a request for arrest in circumstances where a State Party and a third state are involved, article 98(1) respects the doctrine of diplomatic immunity and ensures States Parties are not forced to balance competing legal obligations to the ICC and to other states. 113 The AU applied article 98(1) to the ICC's requests to have al-Bashir arrested upon his arrival in countries that were States Parties. Like they did when the indictment was first announced, the AU argued that because al- 
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Bashir was the current head of a third-party state who enjoyed diplomatic immunity, African States Parties could not be required to arrest and surrender him to the ICC without Sudan's approval. 114 The AU's notion that al-Bashir could not be apprehended and surrendered to the Court was challenged in a hearing before the Court's Pre-Trial Chamber ("PTC"). 115 The PTC concluded that al-Bashir was not entitled to immunity because the UNSC had referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC, as allowed by article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, 116 by calling on the parties involved in the conflict in Darfur to co-operate in bringing al-Bashir to justice. 117 Moreover, the PTC determined that al-Bashir held no immunity because of the implicit waiver that accompanies being a signatory to the UN Charter 118 : Sudan, as a UN Member State, was obligated to abide by the UNSC's Resolution to surrender al-Bashir despite the fact that it was neither a signatory nor a Party to the Rome Statute. The PTC also concluded that States Parties, both in that role and as UN Member States, must abide by the UNSC's Resolution. 119 For better or for worse, the PTC's rejection of the AU's article 98(1) defense and its liberal reading of articles 13(b) and 27 give the ICC access to the UNSC's universal jurisdiction. Consequently, sitting heads of state who are alleged to have committed international crimes have few opportunities to avoid prosecution.
III. The Delegitimization of the ICC
The ICC was created in order to deliver justice for the most heinous international crimes when national court systems are unable to do so. 120 Despite the Court's noble and admirable mission, it has always faced issues of legitimacy stemming primarily from how it handles sovereign 114.
van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 685 (noting that Denmark also used this argument when it invited al-Bashir to Copenhagen).
115. The Pre-Trial Chamber ("PTC") is one of three divisions of the ICC, the other two being Trial and Appeals. The PTC is responsible for confirming or denying indictments. Additionally, "[t]he judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber will issue a warrant of arrest if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the Court's jurisdiction and that the person will not appear voluntarily before the Court, will endanger the proceedings or investigation, or will continue committing crimes if not arrested [Vol. 41:195 immunity. 121 In fact, one of the reasons the United States decided not to become a Party to the Rome Statute was that the statute lacks "an effective mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions of American servicemembers and officials." 122 The U.S. rationale overlaps with two of the AU's biggest concerns with the court: (1) that there is no immunity for sitting officials (discussed above in Part II) and (2) that the Court, as an institution, can be easily politicized (discussed here in Part III). 123 The AU's almost decadelong campaign against the ICC has only bolstered its concerns and has served to further undermine the Court's legitimacy, particularly among smaller or weaker states. 124 If the beliefs and sentiments underlying the tenuous relationship between the ICC and the AU persist, the Court's legitimacy may be even further undermined.
Allegations of ICC politicization come on the back of years of Western intervention in Africa, and the AU argues that the Court exists as a tool for the neo-colonialism and imperialism of more powerful Western countries. 125 This argument has the power to delegitimize the Court by giving the appearance that the Court is no longer seeking justice based on a legal mandate but is instead politically motivated. This argument has mixed support. On the one hand, the Court was designed to exist outside of the racial hierarchies that were created centuries ago through slavery, servitude, and colonialism. For many, though, it is difficult to believe that the ICC is not biased when ten of the eleven cases currently being investigated are from Africa. 130 For instance, former Ethiopian Primer Minister Hailemariam Desalegn once stated, "African leaders have come to a consensus that the [ICC's] process that has been conducted in Africa has a flaw. The intention was to avoid any kind of impunity . . . but now the process has degenerated to some kind of race hunting." 131 Kenyatta, who admittedly has his own biases against the Court, has also made similar claims, stating, "[w]e would love nothing more than to have an international forum for justice and accountability, but what choice do we have when we get only bias and race-hunting at the ICC?" 
A. The ICC in the Context of Existing Global Systems
As a multilateral judicial organization, the ICC must navigate the global systems-whether financial, political, or social-that existed before its creation. Because of its position as an international institution for justice, the Court is forced to interact with, and must consequently challenge, the racism that is embedded in the international system of justice as a result of the legacy of slavery, servitude, and colonialism. 134 Admittedly, this is not an easy task for the Court, but it is one that it must tackle-and tackle with care-if the Court is to gain supporters and maintain its legitimacy in the 134. Tosa, supra note 125, at 57. The legacy of slavery, servitude, and colonialism is particularly shown in the countries that are able to dominate the proceedings of the UNSC, and thus the ICC, despite not being Parties to the Rome Statute. Id.
[Vol. 41:195 global arena, especially in Africa. In a speech he made after al-Bashir's indictment, Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda, stated:
Rwanda cannot be party to ICC for one simple reason . . . with [the] ICC all the injustices of the past including colonialism, imperialism, keep coming back in different forms. They control you. As long as you are poor, weak there is always some rope to hang you. ICC is made for Africans and poor countries. Two thirds of the countries that have signed for this ICC are these poor countries. When they were signing they didn't know what they were signing. They don't know they were signing for a rope to hang themselves. 135 Statements like these regarding the flawed and biased nature of the Court sound in truth to many state leaders who collectively have the power to undermine the Court's legitimacy. As it stands, the Court's actions in Africa have only fueled the belief that when the Court acts against weaker and poorer countries in Africa (and around the world), it does so for colonial and imperialistic reasons on behalf of the West. 136 
B. The UNSC's Control over the ICC
The Court's relationship with the UNSC serves as further troubling proof that the West has some control over the Court's actions. As seen in al-Bashir's case, the UNSC has the ability to refer-and defer-cases to the Court. 137 The UNSC is comprised of fifteen members, five of which-the United States, France, Britain, China, Russia-are permanent members with the other ten being rotating members. 138 As permanent members of the UNSC, the United States, France, and Britain coordinated a referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC. 139 UNSC members which are not party to the Rome Statute-like the United States, China, and Russia-may still vote on whether the Court should indict and try citizens of any country across the world. 140 Unlike the Court, the UNSC has a political mandate; most, if not all, of its actions are politically motivated. 141 The relationship between the Court and the UNSC compromises the Court's role as an organization that is independent and outside the political realm. 142 The UNSC's influence over the Court allows it to direct the Court's power in order to exact "international justice" on weaker, poorer countries that do not wield power in any international forum. 143 This is extremely troubling, as three of the UNSC's five permanent members have not bound themselves legally to the Rome Statute and the Court. For the weaker and poorer countries located in Africa, the UNSC's control over the ICC is simply another neo-colonial tool to maintain the hierarchies that were set in place before, during, and after the Scramble for Africa. 144 The unfettered access given to UNSC States that are not party to the Rome Statute is an issue the Court must contend with, but it has yet to see this entanglement as a problem. 145 The current ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has previously stated that the Court is "not a tool in the hands of [Western] politicians who think they can decide when to plug or unplug us." 146 So far, however, the UNSC has referred cases from just two countries to the ICC-Sudan and Libya. With AU Member States flouting their legal obligations to the Court and their moral responsibilities to the world, it is difficult to say whether al-Bashir will ever be apprehended and tried for the atrocities committed in the Darfur region. This impedes the ICC's ability to effectively carry out its mandate. The ICC's lack of a police force means the Court is wholly dependent on states to implement its decisions, and the AU's conscious obstruction has hampered the Court's ability to pursue justice for African victims.
Unlike the al-Bashir case, the Kenyatta and Ruto matters have been resolved. The AU opposed the ICC's indictment of the Kenyans because their continuous presence at the trials in the Hague-as required by article 63(1) 150 -would have a "negative effect on the demanding responsibilities of African presidents." 151 In order to prevent Kenyatta and Ruto from having to confront conflicting obligations, the Kenyan government and the AU took steps to terminate the cases, or at least to have them postponed while the two were serving as President and Deputy President. 152 The AU lobbied to have Kenyatta and Ruto excused from constant presence during the course of their trials and argued that they should be able to choose which sessions of their trials to attend, so that they could still properly carry out their elected roles. 153 In response, the Trial Chamber granted both Kenyatta and Ruto a conditional excuse from their trials, departing from the general rule of continuous presence in article 63(1). 154 Explaining that Court judges have the discretion to "excuse an accused on a case-by-case basis," the Trial Chamber excused Kenyatta and Ruto from all hearings except for opening and closing statements and the delivery of the judgment. 155 However, the Appeals Chamber quickly reversed this ruling, deeming it "a blanket excusal before the trial had even commenced, effectively making absence the general rule and [their] presence an exception." 156 The Appeals Chamber did agree that judges had discretion in deciding which hearings could be [Vol. 41:195 imbalance in international decision-making processes." 182 The document continues by highlighting the disproportionate and politically-motivated nature of the UNSC's (and thus the ICC's) decision-making process:
[t]he inherent politics of such processes result in unreliable application of the rule of law. In this regard, the decisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are made on the basis of the interests of its Permanent Members rather than the legal and justice requirements. Needless to say, these interests are not always in line with those of Africa, thereby leading to a perception of a double standard against African States.
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While the AU's call for African states to withdraw from the Rome Statute and from the Court is understandable, it is ill-conceived. An exodus of African states would severely limit the number of states over which the Court has immediate jurisdiction. However, it would do little to stop African leaders from being indicted, as the UNSC's referral power allows the Court to side-step the sovereign immunity of all UN Member States, even those that are not party to the Rome Statute. 184 In the Constitutive Act of the African Union, its founding document, the AU claims that one of its goals is to ensure that the human rights of the peoples of Africa are promoted and protected. 185 A withdrawal from the only body that is investigating and holding leaders accountable for the atrocities they commit would only serve to indicate that the AU believes maintaining political power is more important than securing and maintaining the rights and safety of the peoples of African states. Thus, instead of bolstering the AU's place in the sphere of international justice, a mass withdrawal would only serve to further undermine the international rule of law and place a spotlight on the AU as a hypocritical organization. 186 Notably, the loudest individual voices calling for the withdrawal of AU Member States from the ICC are those of leaders whose participation in conflicts within their own countries could rise to the level of an international crime. 187 The call for withdrawal therefore seems to be a self-serving and hypocritical attempt to shield actors who are committing egregious crimes from the reach of the Court. Yet, as shown above, the UNSC's reach is long and simple withdrawal from the Court may not prevent these actors from being charged with committing international crimes in the future. Therefore, mass withdrawal would only create bad optics for the AU and the leaders of [Vol. 41:195 the continent. Namely, if the best way for heads of state to avoid charges is by never leaving office, it is likely that, given the opportunity, they will attempt to remain in power indefinitely.
Furthermore, the AU's proposal does run into at least one additional issue: Inter-state power dynamics are bound to weave themselves into the decisions of regional courts. A regional court has the potential to encounter the same problems the ICC faces, with more globally dominant countries exerting control over the operations of the court. Just as in the global context, certain states within Africa wield more power and wealth than others, and these are usually the states that have greater influence over the actions of the rest of the continent. 194 It follows, then, that these same states and their leaders have the potential to control the prosecutorial agenda of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights. This domination has the power to undermine the legitimacy of that court just as much as the UNSC's domination has the power to undermine the ICC's legitimacy.
C. Solutions for the ICC
There are changes that the ICC can make to regain some legitimacy in the eyes of the AU and its supporters, thereby preventing the mass withdrawal of African states. Severing or lessening the relationship between the ICC and the UNSC, returning to the expected principles of fairness and transparency that brought African nations on board, and making an effort to work alongside the legal and cultural institutions that are in place in African nations to counter the impression that they are working against them would help the Court to regain some of its legitimacy.
The ICC could minimize or sever its relationship with the UNSC. As the relationship stands, the UNSC exerts too much influence over the Court. This is both hypocritical, as three-fifths of the Security Council's permanent members are not themselves Parties to the Rome Statute, and problematic, as the UNSC politicizes the Court and its work. 195 Indeed, it is particularly disturbing when the Court argues "that it derives its moral authority from its claim to pursue international criminal law on legal rather than political grounds." 196 The Court's flawed self-narrative cloaks it in pretense and strengthens the AU's evidence against it by showing that the Court is being deliberately hypocritical in how it operates or naively unaware of how it actually functions in the world.
To restore its legitimacy with African states, the Court should also engage in other forms of what scholars have dubbed "hypocrisy 194.
Power Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.usnews.com/news/ best-countries/power-rankings (last visited Dec. 17, 2019) (ranking Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria as the three most powerful nations on the African continent).
195. Seymour, supra note 6, at 111.
196.
Id. at 110.
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Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC 223 management." 197 In essence, the Court should realign itself with the ideals that brought African states on board with the implementation of the Court decades ago. In particular, the Court must return to being a body that seeks justice under law and which is not motivated by politics. To re-establish this ideal, the Court must, if it retains its connections to the UNSC, make transparent, published, and in-depth evaluations of the merits of any UNSC charging recommendations. Such measures would allow the Court to at least appear impartial.
Additionally, the Court should work with the social and political mechanisms that exist in the specific regions where it is engaged. Because "the ICC, just like the larger international legal order within which it operates, is Eurocentric and the world views, perspectives and stand points it reflects and embeds are uncompromisingly European," it is almost inevitable that Western norms and ideas permeate the operations of the Court. 198 Like nearly every other international organization, "[d]istinctively Euro-American ideals and narratives determine [its] perspectives and standpoints." 199 This is because Europe acts as a "geographical, political, and conceptual epicentre of international legal thought." 200 In using the mechanisms created by and employed by Western and European countries, the Court runs the risk of isolating non-Western countries like those in Africa.
In contrast, if it employs a prosecutorial system that fits within the structures that currently exist in each region, the Court has a greater chance of building relationships with states and of ultimately receiving their cooperation and support. 201 In particular, the Court could undertake two simple measures that would allow for better integration and cooperation between itself and AU Member States. First, the ICC Prosecutor could travel to all African states to meet with regional judiciary, prosecutors, lawyers, and civil society in an attempt to establish constituencies in each country that would help create or enhance support for the Court. Second, the President of the Court and the President of the Assembly of States Parties could plan and engage in "programmatic activities at the national, regional and international levels for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers from state parties to enhance [their] knowledge and understanding of the ICC's work and to enhance complementarity within the state parties." 202 This is vital to the Court retaining (or regaining) its legitimacy, especially in Africa.
